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INTRODUCTION
In small, open countries – operating a floating exchange rate
system – exchange rate fluctuations may play a key role in
macroeconomic processes. Within this, in the conduct of
monetary policy, attention must be paid to the exchange rate,
since larger fluctuations may soon lead to the re-pricing of
products involved in foreign trade or those competing with
them, which may pass through to the prices of other products
and services, as well as to wages in the long run. Emerging
countries in particular often experience that hectic changes in
global risk appetite or the perception of the country leads to
fast, considerable appreciation or depreciation of their
national currencies. In Hungary’s case it is enough to consider
the weakening of the exchange rate in 2003 and 2006, or to
recall the strengthening seen in mid-2008, and then the
significant depreciation suffered as a result of the crisis.
It has long been a moot question in the literature dealing with
optimal monetary policy whether the central bank should take
account of the prevailing exchange rate fluctuations when
making its rate-setting decisions. Central banks usually deem
price stability as their primary objective, which most of them
realise by targeting a pre-announced level of inflation that
corresponds to price stability. Since exchange rate
developments influence inflation prospects, it stands to reason
that monetary policy should strive to neutralise exchange rate
shocks, in order to prevent pass-through to inflation.
However, exchange rate pass-through may change; its speed
and extent may depend on the nature of shocks, as well as on
the expectations of economic agents. It is equally possible that,
in the case of products exposed to external competition, no
rapid re-pricing occurs in response to appreciation or
depreciation of the exchange rate, since price stability in the
medium run may also ensure nominal stability in a broader
sense. In the case of anchored expectations, exchange rate
movements are also often only temporary, and thus it is not
necessarily worth responding to them over the short term.
In my paper, I study how exchange rate shocks are managed
in small, open economies, and whether potentially different
interest policies have an influence on exchange rate pass-
through or the efficiency on inflation targeting. The
approach is an empirical one: that is, I provide, in respect of
a number of countries, an estimate for the impact of changes
in expected risk premia, including central bank responses.
Comparing converging, more developed countries that have
already achieved price stability, I find that the pass-through
of exchange rate shocks to consumer prices could be
considerably reduced only by larger and much more
permanent interest rate measures than those observed in
practice, but much may depend on how firmly expectations
are anchored. It follows from the results that the best
protection against exchange rate shocks of external origin is
provided by the creation of a sustained, low-inflation
environment.
The central banks of small, open countries often face the problem that the exchange rate of their currency appreciates or
depreciates in response to impacts of external origin. Since, over time, these fluctuations are also reflected in consumer prices,
inflation may depart from the optimal level. In my paper I study the way in which monetary policy and consumer prices
respond to exchange rate fluctuations of external origin in the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Hungary
and Sweden. Based on my estimates, I conclude that under normal circumstances a temporarily more aggressive interest policy
alone does not help cushion shocks, and that the sensitivity of domestic prices to the exchange rate is similar in these countries
irrespective of the interest rate policy they adopt. By contrast, price stability and the fact that inflation expectations are firmly
anchored may reduce exchange rate pass-through considerably, which, in terms of inflation, offers better protection against
external shocks. However, the results are not valid under circumstances where the central bank is experiencing severe market
disturbances or panicky behaviour; firm interest measures in these cases may be appropriate and serve the intended purpose.
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Although the question whether a central bank targeting
inflation should respond to exchange rate movements with
interest rate-setting decisions appears to be simple, it is worth
defining more precisely what exactly we mean by this before
answering the question.
Since the foreign exchange market is a financial market,
exchange rates may respond quickly and sensitively to all
economic news and changes. If, for example, demand falls in
a country as a result of a fiscal tightening measure, output
and inflation will also decrease. In such a case, a weaker
exchange rate and lower interest may soften recession in a
way that high inflation is not necessarily a threat. If we
monitor monetary policy patterns, we may have the
impression that central banks respond to weakening of the
exchange rate with interest rate cuts, despite the fact that
exchange rates and interest rates respond to the same news,
i.e. to deteriorating economic prospects, and there is no
obvious causal relation between them. However, in
conducting this study, we are interested in those episodes
when the exchange rate moves for an external reason –
independently of domestic inflation and real economic
processes – because these are the cases when the necessity for
central banks to neutralise the consequences of the shock may
clearly arise.
Thus, appropriate methodology differentiates between the
various exchange rate movements and only looks at those
where exchange rate movements would upset the equilibrium
of the economy. Changes in the expected risk premia on
investments in local currencies are suitable for this purpose.
This is because demand from foreign investors is very often
driven by news of or such changes in investor sentiment,
which are independent of domestic processes.
The identified VAR models divide the movements of the
variables studied into two components: each variable
depends on the historical trends of the other variables, and in
addition, they are also hit by simultaneous shocks. Shocks
may be domestic (demand, technological, demographic
shocks, etc.) or external (shocks exerted by global commodity
prices, global economic activity, risk appetite, etc.).
Appropriate assumptions may enable the model to
differentiate between the impact of macro-economic
processes and other, external impacts in developments in the
central bank base rate.
I propose that a sudden change in risk perception takes
longer than one month before it has any impact on industrial
output and consumer prices. By contrast, it affects short-term
interest rates and exchange rates immediately: as soon as risk
perception deteriorates, the exchange rate weakens and
interest rates will be higher for one year. Accordingly, a
decrease in the expected premium reduces interest rates and
raises the exchange rate.
The concept underlying my assumptions is that prices and
production decisions are fixed in the short term, thus they
respond to changes only with a delay. In contrast, financial
markets respond to new information quickly, often on the
same day.
For the estimate, I used the time series for industrial output,
consumer price level, 3-month market interest and nominal-
effective exchange rate for three converging countries (the
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and three developed
countries (the United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden) mostly
for the sample period between 1995 and 2006. The selection
of countries was based on the availability of comparative
figures and the similarity of their monetary regimes. The
model also took account of the external impacts which I
approximated with the production, consumer prices, short-
term interest rates and exchange rates of Germany in the case
of European countries, and those of the United States in the
case of Canada.
IMPACT OF RISK PREMIUM SHOCKS
After the appropriate specification of VAR and identification
of the required shocks described above, it is possible to
calculate the way the model’s variables respond to an
unexpected change in the risk appetite. The so-called impulse
responses show the extent to which trends in the studied
variable diverge after an average shock from the path it
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • DECEMBER 2009 32
Chart 1
Development of the 3-month market interest rates













Sweden Canadawould have followed without the shock. Chart 1 compares
trends in short-term yields – reflecting the central bank’s
interest rate policy – after an increase in the expected risk
premia in the six countries under review.
The increase in the interest rate due to deteriorating risk
perception or risk appetite is temporary in each country, and
has hardly any impact in the second year after the shock. The
increase in short-term market yields reflects the extra return
expected by investors as compensation for holding risky
assets. Furthermore, the behaviour of central banks also
influences short-term yields strongly, since the pass-through
of an exchange rate that weakens as a result of the shock
would be accompanied by higher inflation, which interest
policy tries to mitigate.
Hungary differs slightly from the other countries, as it appears
that interest rates increase at a faster pace and to a larger
extent. Estimates for the period of 2001–2008 shows that a
rapid, robust response in Hungary’s interest rate policy was
maintained even after the introduction of the inflation
targeting system in 2001, and suggests that, compared with
the rest of the countries under review, the MNB has put more
emphasis on softening exchange rate fluctuations.
2 It is also
worth noting that firm interest rate measures are only
temporary: after six months, interest rate levels in Hungary no
longer differs materially from those in the other countries.
The higher sensitivity of Hungarian interest rates may be
attributable to a number of factors. The narrow-band
exchange rate regime operated until 2001 necessitated more
intense exchange rate management. After 2001, there was
also an intervention band in the inflation targeting regime, at
the edge of which interest rate policy also responded faster to
risk premium shocks. In addition, in 2002–2003 the budget
deficit eroded investors’ confidence, thus in the periods of
sudden declines in the international risk appetite the MNB
had to signal its commitment to maintaining nominal stability
more clearly than the central banks of the other countries
under review.
Chart 2 reveals that an average increase in the expected risk
premium leads to a weakening of the exchange rate which is
similar to what can be observed in the rest of the countries
under review, in terms of its extent and course that it runs.
This may be attributable to the fact that after the shock,
foreign investors receive compensation from two sources for
holding the risky assets: in addition to higher domestic
interest rates, adjustments for the weakening of the exchange
rate also commence, which – according to the estimate –
means appreciation lasting for a year or two.
Since foreign investors are interested in yields realised in their
own currency, during the appreciation period the value of
their investments also increases proportionately. A higher
expected premium is provided by a higher interest rate and
the appreciation that follows immediate depreciation. If after
the shock the central bank softens the weakening of the
exchange rate by a higher interest rate, it offers interest
income to the investor instead of the exchange rate gain
hoped for as a result of future appreciation.
However, it can be proven that in the countries under review
the higher expected premium was ensured mostly by the
strengthening of the exchange rate rather than a higher
interest rate. Accordingly, after a premium shock the extent
of weakening could have only been considerably reduced by
extremely large or significantly prolonged interest measures.
Although the Hungarian interest reaction is significantly
larger than that of the other five countries, the difference is
only temporary, thus – if expressed in exchange rate gain – it
is still negligible, which may provide and explanation for the
similarity of exchange rate reactions.
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH
In the next step, I studied the extent and speed with which
the exchange rate movements generated by risk premium
shocks pass through to consumer prices. In order to ensure
the comparability of the countries, it is worth selecting the
size of the shocks in a way that the shift of the exchange rate
is of a similar size in each country. For this purpose, I
allocated a shock to each model that resulted in the average
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Chart 2
Weakening of the exchange rate after the












2 Hidi (2006) also found that the MNB interest rate responds to the exchange rate fast and significantly.1% depreciation of the exchange rate in the first year. Chart
3 illustrates the response of the consumer price level.
Prices start to increase relatively shortly after the shock,
which is explained by the openness of the foreign trade of the
countries studied and the high ratio of imported products.
Since – after the initial depreciation – the exchange rate
recovers gradually, it is not surprising that the price increase
is also only a temporary phenomenon; prices increase already
in the second year after the shock. However, in addition to
similar dynamics, considerable differences can also be
observed: the inflation impact of deprecation in the United
Kingdom and Canada is half of the impact seen in the rest of
the countries, while from the end of the second year prices
are markedly lower in all three developed countries in the
converging ones.
This phenomenon is due, in part, to the fact that the increase
in the expected premium influences prices via other channels
as well. For example, it is perfectly justified to think that
increasing interest rates in the more developed countries –
due to their deeper financial intermediation – reduce demand
more, which may curb price increase. However, the results
received with regard to the shocks of the monetary policy –
presented in detail in the study – suggest that there is a similar
discrepancy between the two country groups, even when
weakening of the exchange rate is accompanied by interest
rate cuts.
In one of his studies published in 2000, Taylor addresses the
issue of the globally observed weakening of the pass-through
of cost shocks – and, within this, that of exchange rate shocks
– to prices. He argues that the low inflation environment that
had developed by the 1990s anchors inflation expectations.
Since prices are usually fixed in advance for a longer period,
when re-pricing occurs, it is worth considering not only the
actual inflation environment and costs, but also the medium-
term prospects. If, after an exchange rate shock, companies
do not expect a permanent increase in inflation, they will
price in the exchange rate change only to a small extent.
Consequently, the infrequency of re-pricing and anchored
inflation expectations may weaken exchange rate pass-
through.
In our estimate, annual inflation in the countries with more
moderate exchange rate pass-through was low throughout
the sample period, typically fluctuating between 1-3%. By
contrast, in the three transition countries we can observe
rates exceeding even 10%, especially at the start of the
sample period. Based on the logics of the Taylor study, we
may suspect a causal relation between low inflation and weak
exchange rate pass-through.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, we found that shocks of external origin affecting the
exchange rate also appeared in domestic consumer prices. If
the central bank follows an inflation target, it will respond to
these shocks. However, under normal circumstances
exchange rate fluctuations can only be absorbed by ad-hoc
interest measures with a relatively low efficiency. However,
price stability and the degree to which inflation expectations
are anchored may reduce exchange rate pass-through
considerably, which offers higher protection against external
shocks in terms of inflation.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the estimate
was made for a period that was calmer than the present
global crisis. In extreme cases, especially in the case of
disturbances in the financial markets, or when market players
panic, interest rate measures – firmer than usual – may be
justified and efficient; in such cases, however, the direct
objective is not the absorption of inflation impacts, rather
stabilisation of markets and their redirection to the normal
course of operation. Accordingly, the estimate does not
provide useful information as to the nature of the optimal
interest policy to be pursued in turbulent periods.
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Chart 3
Increase in the consumer price level after a risk
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